We describe a competitive model of worker turnover and labor earnings that is consistent with features of labor markets often used to motivate non-competitive models.
Introduction
A satisfactory model of labor markets in industrialized countries should be consistent with a number of well-documented empirical regularities. For example, worker quits fall during recessions while overall job destruction rises; turnover rates are lower both in large firms and in industries with low exit rates; and observationally identical workers earn different wages in different firms and industries. To our knowledge, there does not exist a competitive model that can simultaneously account for all these facts. Indeed, many economists have invoked at least some these facts in their calls for a "richer equilibrium framework than that provided by frictionless, competitive models" (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, p. 2568) .
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In this paper, we propose a model that challenges the notion that a satisfactory theory of turnover and labor earnings cannot be founded on competitive assumptions.
Specifically, we describe a general equilibrium model in which all agents behave competitively. Employed workers split their time between employer specific capital accumulation and delivering labor services. Unemployed workers find a job at the beginning of any given period with a fixed, exogenous probability. In equilibrium, firms less likely to survive offer higher wage rates, because their employees face a higher unemployment risk and a higher risk that their employer specific capital will be lost. Therefore, consistent with the evidence presented in Abowd et al. (1999) , wage seniority profiles are steeper in high survival firms.
If one thinks of firm specific capital as the return to employer specific training, as we do in the exposition, then our model also correctly predicts that training intensity should be negatively correlated with firm characteristics that are associated with higher survival rates, such as age and size (see e.g. Frazis et al., 1995) . Furthermore, quit rates are procyclical, because workers use slow times to retool as in DeJong and Ingram (2001) . Job destruction rates are countercyclical provided gross failure rates for firms rise during recessions, even if the increase is very small as suggested by the existing evidence on corporate failure rates (see Platt and Platt, 1994 , for a review).
Other competitive models yield only some of these implications for turnover. For instance, a matching model where the evolution of worker productivity is exogenous (e.g., Jovanovic, 1979b , or models with passive learning by doing) would also predict that high survival firms have less turnover. However, in models where worker productivity evolves exogenously, the correlation between firm characteristics and worker turnover disappears after controlling for the distribution of tenure, a result not supported by the data (see Topel and Ward, 1992 , Anderson and Meyer, 1994 , or Quintin and Stevens, 2003 . Nor are these models consistent with the observation that wage seniority profiles are steeper in high survival probability firms, or with cyclical features of job destruction and quit rates. By making the evolution of worker productivity endogenous, we are better able to capture labor market features that depend upon the optimal response of workers to their environment.
The economy
We consider a discrete time, infinite horizon model, with three classes of agents: firms, workers, and the government. Firms differ only in their probability of survival. Type H firms survive to the next period with probability p H , while type L firms survive with probability p L < p H . A law of large numbers holds, therefore p i is also the fraction of firms of type i ∈ {H, L} that survive at the end of each period. In each period, a constant mass µ i > 0 of firms of type i are born. Firms of both types that have survived t periods can transform n ≥ 0 units of labor into (1 + η) t n α units of the unique consumption good, where α ∈ (0, 1), and η > 0 is the exogenous rate of learning-by-doing. The following assumption bounds the average size of firms:
A constant measure of workers are born at the beginning of every period. Workers survive to the next period with probability β. We set the measure of newly born workers to (1−β) so that the long-run population size is one. We assume that workers have linear preferences and, therefore, seek to maximize their expected lifetime labor income. All workers are assumed to own the same share of existing firms.
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At the beginning of each period, a worker is either employed by a firm or is unemployed.
The maximum quantity of labor an employed worker can deliver to her employer depends upon her productivity level x, a random variable with values in {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 } where x 0 < x 1 < x 2 . A newly employed worker starts at productivity level x = x 1 .
3 If the worker and employer both survive to the next period, the evolution of the worker's productivity depends on the time s ∈ [0, 1] she devotes to training. If her productivity level is not already x 2 , it rises one notch in the subsequent period with probability h(s) ∈ [0, 1); the function h is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave with h(0) = 0 and h (0) > 0. On the other hand, if her current productivity level is x 1 or x 2 , she moves down one notch with likelihood δ. 4 We think of δ as the likelihood that the worker's productivity level depreciates, an event which can occur for idiosyncratic or firm-wide reasons, or for reasons common to a subset of firms that one could think of as an industry.
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Workers become unemployed if their employer dies, or when they choose to quit. In addition, workers are born unemployed. Unemployment ends with probability φ < 1 at the beginning of any given period, in which case workers may choose an employer of either type.
In their first period of unemployment, previously employed workers receive unemployment benefits equal to a fraction ρ ∈ (0, 1) of their labor income from the previous period. The government finances unemployment benefits through a fixed payroll tax rate τ and refunds excess fiscal revenues to workers in a lump-sum fashion. The following assumption makes verifying budget balance simpler:
Our economy can generate several types of steady-state equilibria. For example, there are sets of exogenous parameters for which unemployed agents accept all job offers, and other sets for which unemployed workers only accept job offers after their benefits have expired.
We make three more assumptions that simplify the exposition by enabling us to concentrate 3 In particular, we assume for simplicity that productivity levels are fully employer specific: workers at x 2 who lose or quit their job fall back to x 1 with certainty. Allowing for partially general human capital would complicate notation without changing any of our results.
4 Assuming that δ does not vary with s simplifies the exposition and the analysis, but does not alter any of our qualitative results. 5 We assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty, but we do not require the evolution of worker productivity to be independent across workers or firms.
on one type of equilibrium. Assumption 3 ensures that, in steady state, unemployed workers are always better off accepting job offers than turning them down.
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Assumption 3. ρx 2 < x 1
Next we assume that in steady state the rate of exogenous technological growth always exceeds the average rate of productivity growth of existing employees, so that all firms have to hire new workers in every period. Leth = max s∈ [0, 1] h(s).
Assumption 4.hβ
Finally we set x 0 low enough so that in steady state workers at x = x 0 choose to quit (see Proposition 3 below).
We now turn to defining and characterizing steady state equilibria in our economy.
Steady-state equilibria
Denote by w i the wage rate offered by a firm of type i ∈ {H, L}. Workers at productivity level x who devote time s to training earn (1 − s)xw i in type i firms.
7 A type i firm of age t ≥ 0 chooses effective labor input n to maximize profits:
Total labor demand for each firm type is the sum of optimal labor demands across firms of that type. As for labor supply, employed workers of a given productivity level split their time between training and delivering labor so as to maximize their expected lifetime labor income.
6 In most states, the law prohibits workers who receive unemployment benefits from turning down "acceptable" offers. The degree to which that requirement is enforced, however, is unclear.
7 Since workers have linear preferences, many compensation schemes are weakly optimal in the absence of contractual imperfections. For example, workers could be paid in every period the average value their marginal product during each employment spell. Our main results are independent of the specific payment scheme adopted by workers and firms. The only exception is proposition 6, which compares the shape of the seniority profile across firm types. That result requires a positive correlation between current earnings and current productivity.
In the appendix, we formally state the corresponding optimization problem. Steady-state equilibria, in this context, are constant wage rates for each firm type such that labor markets clear and the government's budget is balanced in every period. We establish in the appendix that a unique steady state equilibrium pair of wage rates exists in this economy for all sets of exogenous parameters that satisfy assumptions 1 to 5. Furthermore, because high survival firms offer better training opportunities and a lower unemployment risk, general equilibrium considerations imply that the wage rate is higher in firms whose survival is less likely. Our first proposition records these findings. We can now characterize the seniority profiles of productivity and earnings in both firm types. Given proposition 3, the evolution of the productivity level of a worker employed in a firm of type i ∈ {H, L}, conditional on the continuation of the employment relationship, is governed by a Markov chain with two states, x 1 and x 2 , and with transition matrix:
is the probability that a worker employed in a firm of type i moves up to productivity level x 2 . For i ∈ {H, L} and t ≥ 0, denote by E t i (x) the average productivity level of workers with t periods of tenure in type i firms. The following result characterizes the evolution with tenure of this average.
Proposition 5.
In steady state,
Proof. The first two items are standard results for two-state Markov chains. The last item is a direct consequence of proposition 4.
Therefore, with tenure, average earnings rise to an invariant value. This convergence is monotonic when productivity levels are persistent in the sense that a worker's expected productivity level in the next period, conditional on the worker keeping the same employer, rises with the current level of productivity. When that condition is not met, earnings oscillate ever closer to their invariant value.
The last item of proposition 5 says that at equal tenure, the average productivity of workers is higher in high survival firms. One natural question to ask therefore is whether workers employed in type H firms eventually earn more than workers employed in type L firms. They are at a higher productivity level on average than workers employed in type L firms, but they also spend more time in training and have a lower wage rate. By proposition 5, workers employed in type H firms eventually earn more than workers employed in type L firms if and only if
The following result says that whenever p L is small enough and φ, the hazard rate out of unemployment, is high enough, condition (3.1) holds in steady state. 
Proof. See appendix
The argument is simple. When p L = 0, inequality 3.1 becomes:
In this case, workers in type L firms earn x 1 w L at all tenure levels, as they devote no time to training. But if inequality 3.2 does not hold, and φ = 1, employees in type L firms earn more than employees in type H firms in all periods of their life, an outcome that cannot persist in steady state. The proposition is then obtained with a continuity argument.
We now invoke the last item of proposition 5 to demonstrate that steady state quit and job destruction rates are higher in type L firms than in type H firms. Quit rates are the fraction of workers who decide to quit at the beginning of a given period. The job destruction rate for a given firm type is the sum of quits and involuntary separations, i.e. quits plus jobs lost due to firm death, divided by total employment. 9 The following results also makes note of an obvious corollary of proposition 5: Quit rates are inversely related to tenure in this economy as in Jovanovic (1979a) , and as in the data.
Proposition 7. In steady state,
• Average quit rates are higher in type L firms than in type H firms;
• Average quit rates are also higher in type L firms at each tenure level;
• Quit rates decrease with tenure in both firm types;
• The job destruction rate is higher in type L firms than in type H firms.
Proof. Proposition 5 implies that workers employed in type H firms are less likely to fall to productivity level x 0 , at all tenure levels. This implies the first three items of the proposition.
As for the fourth, note that p L < p H implies that involuntary separations are more frequent for workers employed in type L firms than workers employed in type H firms.
Our model, therefore, is consistent with cross-sectional features of turnover rates. We now turn to comparing the dynamic predictions in our model to the relevant evidence.
9 Specifically, let ω i be the fraction of workers whose productivity level is x 1 in firms of type i ∈ {H, L}. The turnover (quit) rate in industry i is ω i δ while the job destruction rate is 1 − βp i (1 − ω i δ). 
Dynamic implications
In this section we consider equilibria where wage rates vary over time. Equilibria, as before, are sequences of wage rates such that in each period, firms and workers behave optimally, labor markets clear, and budget balance is obtained. Our main objective in this section is to check that our model is consistent with the fact that in the U.S., quit rates are procyclical while job destruction and training rates are countercyclical. In our dynamic experiments, we will assume that our economy is initially in steady state and consider the effects of unexpected shocks to an exogenous parameter. First, however, we review parameter selection and some selected steady state statistics.
Parameter choices
We will think of a period as a quarter and select parameters to match the appropriate features of U.S data. Details may be found in appendix B. Broadly speaking, the parameters shown in table 1 are such that the steady state generated by our model matches empirical estimates of the duration of unemployment, the time devoted to training, returns to training, the average earnings loss following an involuntary separation, and other U.S. statistics.
Steady state statistics
Summary statistics for the steady state obtained using these parameters are in table 2. As summarized by proposition 2, high survival firms are larger because they are more productive on average in total factor terms. Given our parameterization, type H firms have roughly twice as many employees as type L firms. Table 2 also illustrates proposition 5: The twoyear earnings growth profile is twice as steep in high survival firms as in low survival firms.
The quarterly quit rate in low survival firms is nearly double the rate in high survival firms.
Higher quit rates together with a lower firm survival rate imply that the job destruction rate in type L firms is also much higher. Proposition 7 also says that turnover rates must be higher in low survival firms after controlling for tenure, a result that is illustrated in figure 1.
Cyclicality of turnover and job destruction
In order to assess the cyclical behavior of turnover and job destruction, we shock exogenous parameters and compute the transition path back to steady state. 10 For each shock, we plot the percent deviation from steady state for select variables of interest-wages, output per worker, training intensity, quit rates, job destruction rates, and the unemployment rate.
We first shock total factor productivity (TFP)-which in our model is (1 + η) t for firms 10 Specifically, the algorithm for computing a transition path is as follows. The initial and final steady states are computed using standard methods; in the examples considered here the initial and final steady states are the same. We assume that the transition is complete after T periods, for large T , and we guess an initial path for w L . We then repeat the next two steps 50, 000 times at which point the transition path has been solved (i.e., the labor market clears in each period and the policy functions solve the appropriate maximization problem):
(1) Starting at period t = T −1 the value and policy functions are computed iteratively back to period t = 1; w H is chosen so that newly hired workers are indifferent between the two industries,
(2) Labor clearing is not guaranteed at this point, as w L was fixed for each t. Therefore, for each period t = 1, . . . , T − 1, we adjust wages by a very small amount in the direction needed to clear the labor market. where θ 1 ∈ (−1, 1) is the magnitude of the shock, θ 2 ∈ [0, 1) is the shock's persistence, and i ≥ 0 denotes the number of periods since the shock. The persistence parameter was set to 0.92; this value was corresponds to a half-life of 3-1/2 years, a standard estimate of the average half-life of business cycle shocks in the U.S. The results of a 1 percent shock to TFP are illustrated in figure 2. On impact, firms find themselves with too much labor, and so wage rates must fall in order to clear the labor market. Workers, anticipating higher future wages, devote more time to training and less time to production. This behavior is consistent with workers "retooling" during recessions (DeJong and Ingram, 2001) .
11 Lower TFP and more time spent on training imply that output per worker must fall. Consequently, aggregate output also drops. With more training, fewer workers drop to x 0 , and so fewer workers choose to quit, as in the data. During slow times, workers train more and quit less often. Unlike the evidence from U.S. data, however, these procyclical quit rates lead to procyclical job destruction.
The reason for this counterfactual result is that a TFP shock, as we have modeled it, has no effect on firm survival rates and therefore all deviations from steady state reflect only the behavior of worker quits. In a downturn, we also expect firm survival to decline.
Indeed, existing empirical evidence on business failures documents a small, but significant, increase in failures during downturns (Platt and Platt, 1994) . Therefore, we redo the above analysis for a joint shock to both TFP and firm survival rates. The TFP shock is the same as before, but we now divide p L and p H by a common factor. Although data on business failure rates suggest that shocks to survival rates are less persistent than shocks to TFP, we chose to use the same degree of persistence. This assumption biases our experiment against finding procyclical quit rates, as a more persistent shock to survival probabilities increases the likelihood of countercyclical quits. As before, we consider a 1 percent shock to TFP; the survival rate shock is 0.01 percent (i.e., 1 out of every 10,000 businesses per quarter). The impact of this joint shock is summarized in figure 3 . Wages, output per worker, and training are similar to the TFP-only shock, and we still find procyclical quit rates. Importantly, because of the increase in firm failures, job destruction rates are now countercyclical. In other words, while procyclical quit rates tend to lower job destruction, this effect is more than offset by a rise in involuntary separations due to the lower survival probabilities of firms, even though the survival shock is very small. The net effect is that unemployment rises.
Sensitivity analysis
The fact that our model's dynamic behavior is consistent with turnover facts in the U.S. remains true for other reasonable sets of exogenous parameters. Although all the evidence suggests that important resources are devoted to training, the existing data on training intensity and returns are imprecise (see Barron et al., 1997) . We experimented with a wide variety of parameters choices (within the confines of assumptions 1 to 5), and found our findings to be robust to those changes. Another potential concern is that the choice for δ suggested by the microeconomic evidence reviewed by Mincer (1991) leads to an economywide quarterly quit rate of 1 percent, which is much below the 4.5 percent average calculated by Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) for the 1960-1981 time period in the U.S. Raising δ from 0.02 to 0.05 yields a quit rate closer to its empirical counterpart, and does not affect our results.
Finally, the shape of the production technology in the type of model we laid out is a source of debate. Like Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) , we set α = 0.64 to match the labor income share in the U.S., but Atkeson et al (1996) , among others, argue that the implied returns to scale are too low. Raising α to near the upper bound implied by assumption 1 did not change our findings: Quits continue to fall during recessions, while job destruction rises.
Conclusion
Our paper characterizes the impact of firm survival on the accumulation of employer specific capital in a general equilibrium model. Quite intuitively, workers employed in firms highly likely to survive accumulate more firm specific human capital than their counterparts in low survival firms. These accumulation patterns have several implications for the behavior of turnover across firms in steady state and the evolution of turnover rates following business cycle shocks that are consistent with the relevant empirical evidence.
The fundamental force behind our findings is that workers can influence the evolution of their level of employer specific capital. Assuming instead that firm specific capital evolves exogenously (i.e., h(s) = h > 0 for all s ∈ [0, 1])) would make our model very similar to the model of turnover described by Jovanovic (1979b) . In that case, one easily shows that turnover rates continue to be lower in high survival firms, as workers in those firms tend to have higher productivity levels. Also, wage-seniority profiles continue to rise to an invariant value. What, then, distinguishes this exogenous worker productivity model from our endogenous accumulation model? First, in the exogenous model, wage-seniority profiles do not differ across firms: The growth rate of productivity is the same in all firms at all tenure levels. While the early panel evidence of Barron et al. (1987) is ambiguous on this question, Abowd et al. (1999, and Meyer, for instance, find that turnover rates fall with firm size, whether or not one controls for tenure effects, as predicted by our model. Third, the exogenous model makes no prediction about the optimal quantity of training workers receive whereas the endogenous model predicts that workers employed in firms more likely to survive should receive more training on average, as they do according to the 1995 survey of employer-provided training described by Frazis et al. (1998) . Fourth, the endogenous model allows for procyclical quit rates and countercyclical job destruction rates because agents use slow times to retool. That effect is absent from the exogenous model.
In summary, our claim is that the existing evidence strongly suggests that productivity differences across workers arise endogenously. However, the intuition we develop in this paper does not depend on one's view of how employer specific capital ought to be understood. For instance, this specific capital could take the form of a collateral employees accumulate to alleviate contractual frictions such as unobservable effort (see Lazear, 1981) . The fact that training intensity varies across firm types in a manner similar to our model suggests to us that human capital accumulation choices are important and that adding contractual frictions to our model would only reinforce our general findings.
A Proofs

A.1 Government budget balance
Assume that we have found a pair of constant wage rates (w L , w H ) such that the labor market clears in every period. We will show that government revenues exceed aggregate unemployment benefits, so that we have in fact found a steady state. Workers at productivity level x 1 in type L firms earn (1 − s L )x 1 w L in a given period, where s L is the optimal training policy given wage rates. The tax revenue associated with these workers is τ (1 − s L )x 1 w L . The fraction of workers that die at the end of the period is (1 − β). The fraction of surviving workers that quit or lose their job in each period and fail to find a new job immediately is less than (δ + 1 − p L )(1 − φ). The corresponding unemployment benefit for these workers is
w L under assumption 2, this type of worker increases tax revenues more than government expenses. Similar arguments show that this is the case for all possible types of workers, which establishes that tax revenues exceed total unemployment benefits, as claimed.
A.2 Statement of the worker's problem
We will now characterize the decisions of workers given wage rates. Fix (w L , w H ). For i ∈ {H, L} and j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, denote by V i j the expected lifetime labor income of a worker employed by a firm of type i and whose productivity level is x j , so that, for instance, V L 0 denotes the expected lifetime income for a worker of productivity level x 0 who works for a firm of type L. In any steady state we must have V L 1 = V H 1 , as otherwise one firm type would not be able to hire workers, which is incompatible with the fact that both firms have positive labor demand at all wage rates.
A.2.1 Value function of unemployed workers
Consider a worker who just became unemployed and whose current benefits are b ≥ 0 (that is, their earnings in the previous period were 
where
Indeed, they find a job with probability φ and accept it when V L 1 ≥ V U (b). With probability 1 − φ they do not get a job offer, get the benefits in the current period, remain unemployed, and benefits expire after one period. We will now argue that assumption 3 implies that
the contradiction we sought. The last inequality follows from the fact that a feasible policy for newly employed workers consists of devoting no time to training in the first period and quitting after one period. Therefore, for simplicity and without any loss of generality, we will write, for all b ≥ 0:
A.2.2 Proof of proposition 3
To simplify the statement of the worker's problem, we begin by proving proposition 3.
Proof. Consider an employee in a type H firm (for concreteness) whose productivity reaches x 0 . If she stays with her employer, her expected lifetime income is bounded above by
On the other hand, if she quits, her expected lifetime income is bounded below by:
The worker will quit provided the upper bound from staying is less than the lower bound from quitting, or
But this inequality follows from assumption 5, and the fact that V H 1 > x 1 w H . The second item of the proposition was established in subsection A.2.1.
A.2.3 Value function of employed workers
Having established proposition 3, we need only consider employed workers whose productivity level is x 1 or x 2 . Fix i ∈ {H, L}. Expected incomes for workers employed in type i firms must satisfy the following conditions in steady state:
To see this, consider first equation (A.2) . A worker whose current productivity level is x 1 and chooses to devote time s to training receives (1 − s)x 1 w i in labor income in the current period. As for future periods, assume first that the firm survives, which occurs with likelihood p i . The worker moves up to productivity level x 2 with probability h(s), in which case she remains with the firm and expects income V i 2 . With probability δ her human capital falls to level x 0 , she quits, and expects future income V U (ρ(1−s)x 1 w i ). With probability 1−δ−h(s), she remains at productivity level V i 1 . If the firm fails, which occurs with probability (1 − p i ), the agent becomes unemployed, and expects future income V U (ρ(1 − s)x 1 w i ). Condition (A.3) is justified in the same fashion, and uses the fact that workers do not devote any time to human capital accumulation when they reach level x 2 .
Solving equation
. Plugging this into A.2 now gives:
Given expression (A.1), the right-hand side of equation (A.4) defines a mapping on IR + in V i 1 . That mapping has a unique fixed point, as we now argue.
Lemma 1. The right-hand side of equation (A.4) defines a contraction mapping on IR + .
Proof. Fix i ∈ {H, L}. Consider the mapping T : IR + → IR + which to every value V 1 associates the right-hand side of (A.4). By construction, solutions of (A.4) and fixed points of T coincide. We will now argue that T is a contraction. T is clearly monotonic. Now note that expression (A.1) implies
< 1. These observations and some algebra imply that for all V 1 > 0 and c > 0,
is a contraction with modulus β.
It is easy to see that given i ∈ {H, L}, the optimal training policy s i is uniquely defined, because h is continuous and strictly concave. Furthermore, s i is a continuous in all parameters by the Theorem of the Maximum. In particular, it is easy to see that, for i ∈ {H, L}, V i 1 is linear in wages and the solution s i to (A.4) is independent of wage rates, a fact upon which we will rely to establish that a unique pair of steady state wage rates exists. 
We will use this last fact in the proof of proposition 2.
A.3 Proof of proposition 1
Given assumption 4, it can never be the case that the demand for labor on the part of a given firm falls short of the intended supply of labor by existing employees. Therefore, labor market clearing requires only that overall labor demand equal overall labor supply for each firm type. We now show that this obtains for a unique pair of wage rates.
Proof. Fix w L . Since V L 2 rises without bound with w H , there is a unique wage rate
Furthermore, g is continuous and rises with w L . Let D i (w i ) be the aggregate labor demand by firms of type i when the wage rate is w i . By assumption 1, D i < +∞ for i ∈ {H, L}. Furthermore, both demand functions are continuous and strictly decreasing on IR + . We will construct an equilibrium where workers always work for the same type of firms. Since expected incomes must be equal in equilibrium across firm types, such a policy is always (weakly) optimal.
For i ∈ {H, L}, denote by S i the average supply of labor by agents who work for firms of type i during their lifetime given optimal human capital accumulation policies
, we can construct an equilibrium by assigning fraction σ L (w L ) of workers to type L firms and fraction σ H (w L ) to type H firms.
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To see that such a value for w L exists observe first that σ L and σ H are continuous since labor demand functions are continuous. In this case, their average labor income when employed is at least as high as that of workers in type L firms, but the expected time they spend in unemployment is lower. Therefore, V
contradiction. This completes the proof.
As we point out in the proof above, workers whose unemployment spell ends are indifferent between the two employer types, and so employer choice policies are indeterminate. But the average labor supply to each firm type is independent of the specification of employer policies, as this average only depends on the age distribution of employees; in turn, this age distribution only depends on the survival probabilities of firms and workers. Therefore, the exact specification of the employer choice policy cannot affect steady state equilibrium wage rates, and so wage rates are unique.
A.4 Proof of proposition 2
We now show that for p H high enough, type H firms are larger than type L firms in employment terms in all steady states.
Proof. For i ∈ {H, L}, the average labor demand by type i firms is given by:
Note that µ i /(1 − p i ) is the long-run number of firms of type i. We showed earlier that in any steady state, w L > w H . Recall also, that the labor supply of a worker in a type H firm is bounded above by x 2 , so the average labor supply by workers in type H firms, S H , is also bounded by x 2 . Finally, note that the average labor supply in type L firms, S L , does not 13 Because the size of the population of workers is one, σ i is also the number of workers assigned to type i firms for i ∈ {H, L}. depend on p H . Then, taking the ratio of the average employment size of type H firms to the average employment size of type L firms,
L is unaffected, and the ratio diverges to +∞ which establishes proposition 2.
A.5 Proof of proposition 4
Next we establish that in steady state, workers employed in type H firms devote more time to training than workers employed in type L firms.
Proof. For the purpose of this proof, we find it more convenient to work with equations (A.2-A.3) than their reduced version (A.4). Consider a steady state pair of wage rates and assume that both s L and s H are interior; other cases are trivial. Given (A.2), the first order condition for s i for i ∈ {H, L} is: 
The left-hand side of condition (A.5) can be written as the sum of three terms:
But b(p) = 0 for all p since, given p, V 2 and V 1 are linear in w. So we only have to show that a(p) + c(p) ≥ 0 for all p. Using the envelope theorem and dropping the arguments of function h to curb notation,
> 0 (as can be seen by partially differentiating equation A.2) and βpδ > βpδ
This completes the proof.
A.6 Proof of proposition 6
We now demonstrate that for p L small enough and φ high enough, workers employed in type H firms earn more than small firm workers past a certain tenure threshold.
Proof. Fix p H and assume that φ = 1 so that workers are never unemployed. As explained in the text, it suffices to show that (3.1) holds for p L small enough. Set p L = 0 and let w * 1 be the corresponding steady state wage rate in type L firms. Equation (3.1) holds in that case in steady state since otherwise we would have V
, which can't be in equilibrium. Using the notation introduced in the proof of proposition 1, and similar arguments as in that proof, > 0 can be found so that
In turn, given the continuity of policy functions in survival probabilities, this implies that for p L small enough, the steady state wage rate w L is in N (w * L ). Appealing again to the continuity of policy functions, condition (3.1) continues to hold for p L small enough and φ high enough, as claimed.
B Parameter selection
We set the hazard rate φ out of unemployment to 0.5 so that unemployment spells last 1−.5
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= 1 quarter on average. This is the average time between separation and re-employment estimated by Anderson and Meyer (1994) using data from eight state unemployment systems between 1978 and 1984. We set the replacement rate ρ to 60 percent, the average U.S. replacement rate (OECD, 1997) . In our simulations, we assume that benefits are available for two quarters, as they are in most U.S. states. 15 We set τ to 21 percent, the overall payroll tax rate for the 1989 to 1994 period in the U.S. (Nickell and Layard, 1999) .
We use data on plant deaths by 4-digit NAICS industries to set p L and p H . The data were created by the Census Bureau using the 1998 and 1999 County Business Patterns data. We only consider industries with at least 1,000 establishments. The minimum and maximum annual plant death rates in the resulting sample were 4.6 percent and 20.1 percent. We set p L and p H to the corresponding quarterly survival rates of approximately 94 percent and 98 percent. To set β, the fraction of workers who remain in the labor force, we assume that transitions from employment to out of the labor force are only permanent for individuals over the age of 55. Fallick and Fleischman (2002) , using Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1994 to 2001, find that individuals over the age of 55 account for 13 percent of employment in the U.S., and that 4.3 percent of those individuals, on average, leave the labor force each month. We therefore set our survival rate β to . 87+.13×(1−0.043) 3 98 percent. The degree α of strict concavity of the production function is set to 0.64. This value is roughly equal to the average share of labor income in U.S. Gross National Product between 1960 and 1990 implied by standard real business cycle calculations (see Cooley, 1995) .
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Setting η, the quarterly rate of growth of output per unit of labor, is more difficult. Standard measures of labor productivity would overestimate that number since they do not take into account the fact that average labor quality rises over time in surviving firms due to training. Total factor productivity (TFP) is inadequate for the same reason. On the other hand, TFP may underestimate η since it controls for growth in the capital stock, which is not in our model. For lack of better data, we use Baily et al's (1992) estimates of TFP growth in manufacturing plants between 1972 and 1987 as a rough guide. Conveniently for our purposes, they produce separate TFP growth estimates for plants who remain in the sample (i.e. do not fail) between census years. For these plants, they calculate (see Table 2 , p. 210) a compound TFP growth of 27 percent between 1972 and 1987 which translates into an average quarterly growth rate of 0.4 percent, our selection for η.
We set the quarterly depreciation rate for on-the-job training, δ, to 2 percent. This value is the midpoint of the 4 to 12 percent range of annual rate estimates reported by Mincer (1991) . For our specification of the function h, we assume that it is quadratic. Specifically, h(s) = as−bs 2 for all s ∈ [0, 1] where a, b > 0. We choose the ratio a/b to match the elasticity of labor productivity to the on-the-job training of newly hired employees reported by Barron et al. (1987) . Barron et al. use data from a 1982 survey financed by the National Institute of Education and the National Center for Research in Vocational Training. The survey collected data for 659 firms on the on-the-job training received by newly hired workers in the first three months of employment, and the productivity and wages of those same workers after two years of employment. In each firm, a manager or firm owner provided training data on two recently employed workers (see Bishop, 1987 , for a detailed description of the data). The fact that the survey focuses on new hires is convenient for our purposes since new hires are unambiguously at productivity level x 1 in our model. Barron et al. estimate that at the mean time devoted to training in their sample (151 hours in the first 3 months, roughly 30 percent of an average hire's hours worked), a 10 percent increase in training raises productivity (output per worker) by 3 percent after two years. Separately, Bishop (1991) calculates that roughly half of this productivity gain occurs during the first quarter of employment.
17 We therefore choose a/b so that at s = .3,
. This leaves us with two parameters to set: a and x 2 . We choose these parameters jointly to match two statistics: 1) the average share of time devoted to on-the-job training by U.S. employees and 2) the average loss of earnings by high earners (see definition below) in the U.S. economy following an involuntary separation. The first statistic is notoriously difficult to obtain (see e.g. Barron et al., 1997) . Based on a 1995 survey of employerprovided training of 1,074 employees from establishments with 50 or more employees, Frazis et al. (1998) calculate that, on average, employees receive 44.5 hours of formal and informal training during a 6 month period, roughly 4.5 percent of hours worked. This is the fraction we will match. For the second statistic, we use data from the displaced worker supplement to the January Current Population Survey which is available every other year between 1988 and 2000. We only consider workers between the ages of 16 and 65 who report they lost a job in the past 5 years (3 years in supplements after 1994), who were employed full-time in their previous jobs and are employed full-time in their current jobs, and who had at least one year of tenure in their previous job. We then classify workers into gender-age-education cells according to whether their age exceeds 40, and whether they have some college education. (930) Notes: Sample consists of workers who lost a job in previous five years (3 years after 1994). Top earners are workers whose earnings in lost job were above the 75th percentile in their gender-age-education category. Number in parenthesis are number of observations used to compute each statistic.
the 75th percentile in their respective cells, our practical definition of high earners.
19 In our model, those observations would correspond to workers whose productivity level at the time they lost their job was x 2 . We then compute the CPS-weighted average job loss in each cell, and the CPS-weighted average job loss across cells. The results are shown in table 3. The average loss across cells turns out to be near 20 percent for most years and, reassuringly, fluctuates relatively little from year to year. Also reassuring is the fact that consistent with previous studies (for example, Farber, 1997) , we find that the average loss tends to rise with age and decrease with education, and it tends to be higher for men. Given a set of parameters, the average earnings loss in our model is endogenous, as it depends on training decisions. We searched over wide grids for a and x 2 and found that setting a = 1.3 and x 2 = 1.1 produces the desired steady state statistics. 
